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In this paper a group decision making problem in a competitive situation with two 
opponents is considered. Uncertainty in the score assessment for both opponents of 
any individual of the group as well as between group members is taken into account 
by means of fuzzy sets. The individual scores can be obtained either direct or via 
pairwise comparisons of alternatives. The group scores are then mapped into a fuzzy 
set of preference orderings using the extension principle. By extending metagames to 
a fuzzy metagame analysis the possible stable symmetric metaequilibria can be found 
as well as fuzzy ratings for each of the stable metaequilibria. The highest ranking 
stable metaequilibrium is then obtained by a fuzzy ranking procedure. 
Keywords: fuzzy ordering, fuzzy metagame analysis, group deciflon making 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In the last 30 years a number of techniques have been developed to help a decision 
maker or a group of decision makers to solve his/their problem. Since almost all real 
world decision making problems are multicriteria problems, it is obvious that in the 
solution much attention must be paid to the trade-offs between criteria. The decision 
making for this kind of problems consists essentially of four phases: . 
- structuring of the problem and elicitation of the relevant criteria and the possible 
alternatives; 
- preference elicitation of the various alternatives with respect to the criteria; 
- determination of the relative weights of the various criteria and the final aggregation 
of the preferences on the criteria to an overall ranking; 
- performing sensitivity analysis and making the final decision. 
In the literature much attention has been paid to cases where no competitive aspect is 
involved. In other words, cases where the consequences of actions made by the 
decision maker are assumed to depend only on the choice made by him. The 
elaboration of the four phases differs for well-known techniques as MAUT (Keeney, 
Raiffa, 1976), SMART (Edwards, 1971), AHP (Saaty, 1980), outranking methods 
(Roy, 1990). In the modeling phase value trees or so-called hierarchies might help to 
structure the problem. A methodology for structuring open problems with multiple 
stakeholders is developed by Kolkman (1993). Keeney (1992) introduces the concept· 
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of value focused thinking as a means to obtain alternatives. The choice of technique in
the second and third phase depends on a number of aspects of which the most
important ase the degree of compensatoriness of the scores of the alternatives on the
criteria and the presence and nature of uncertainty involved in the problem. The fourth
phase is necessary to analyze the impact of inconsistencies in the elicitation process.
If the result is not robust, the various steps in the process should be reexamined.
The problem we consider in this paper is the Fuzzy Group Decision Making in a
Competitive Situation Problem (FGDMCSP). Contrary to the problem mentioned
above where only one decision maker is involved, i.e. where competition is
considered not at all or at best only in an implicit way, we take as our starting-point
the strategies for two competing decision makers in a nonzero-sum game situation
(see e.g. Thomas (1984)). This kind of problems occurs in a number of situations, e.g.
competitors trying to improve their market share or in conflict analysis (see e.g.
Fraser, Hipel, 1984). The first step in the analysis is the determination of strategies by
the players. Any combination of strategies of the two players can be considered as a
possible real world situation that can occur and has to be taken into account. Each
player has to determine an optimal alternative anticipating his opponent’s possible
reaction. This problem is well-known in game theory in case of exact payoffs of the
various combinations of strategies. In many situations however, these payoffs are hard
to determine. A preference ordering of the alternatives can sometimes be determined
more easily, at least in a deterministic situation with only one decision maker. Now,
an aspect we want to take into account explicitly here is the group decision aspect. We
assume that a group of experts (decision analysts helping the decision maker) or
decision makers representing player 1 has to assess the preference ordering for both
competitors. Such ordinal rankings can then be used in a metagame analysis (see
Thomas, 1984) to find stable symmetric metaequilibria corresponding to rational
outcomes for both players.
In our approach of the FGDMCSP we do not pay attention to the problem structuring
phase and the generation of the strategies (i.e. alternatives) for the competitors. We
consider the underlying criteria in the preference elicitation process for the
alternatives to be implicit. As a matter of fact, this makes the use of fuzzy sets (see
Zadeh, 1965, Zinimermann, 1987) rather natural. The inherent strength of fuzzy set
theory is its capability of handling messy judgements on aspects of the problem on
hand by means of membership grades. An interesting and new feature of the method
to solve the FGDMCSP is the combination of fuzzy preferences with metagame
theory. Throughout the calculations the individual preferences of the team members
are taken into account as long as possible by using fuzzy sets as group scores which
leads to a fuzzy set of stable metaequilibria.
In Seëtion 2 two methods to obtain a fuzzy group preference ordering are developed,
both consisting of two phases. In the first phase individual as well as group scores for
the alternatives are determined by the group of experts for both players. Secondly, a
mapping is defined that converts the fuzzy group scores into a fuzzy preference
ordering. The first method uses straightforward ratings of alternatives on a symmetric
scale. The second one uses pairwise comparisons of alternatives on the same
symmetric scale. The result of the chapter is a fuzzy set of group preference orderings.
Having calculated the fuzzy preference orderings for both players, we use in Section 3
an extension of metagame analysis (Thomas, 1984) to fuzzy sets to obtain the
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symmetic stable metaequilibria that correspond with rational combinations of 
strategies for both players. Furthermore, these metaequilibria are rated and the highest 
ranking metaequilibrium is assessed using Jain's method (see Zimmermann, 1987). 
This method is a modification of an approach used by Baas and Kwakernaak (1977) 
to rate and rank multiple-aspect alternatives using fuzzy sets. In this approach not 
only the scores are modeled by fuzzy sets, but also the weights of the criteria. In our 
case the combinations of preferences for both players leading to a certain 
metaequilibrium can be seen as criteria and.their membership grades as fuzzy weights. 
Then the rating of a symmetric metaequilibrium is equal to the aggregation of the 
membership grades of the combinations of strategies leading to this specific 
symmetric metaequilibrium. Next, Jain's method is used to determine the highest 
ranking or most stable combination of strategies for both players. Finally, some 
attention is paid to actions that can be undertaken by the decision maker to influence 
the preferences of the opponent in case the outcome of the analysis differs from his 
preferred combination of strategies for both parties. 
In Section 4 an example is worked out. Finally, conclusions are drawn and some 
generalizations are discussed in Section 5 . 
. 2. FUZZY PREFERENCE ORDERING ANALYSIS 
In this section we discuss the way in which a group of experts can obtain a fuzzy rank 
ordering for a number of given alternatives starting from their individual (fuzzy) 
scores for these alternatives. Suppose that N alternatives (AI, ... , AN) are given. In our 
context the alternatives are combinations of strategies for both players, so N equals 
the product of the numbers of strategies for the players. The methods explained 
below, however, are generally applicable. Assume that the score is expressed on a. 
discrete symmetric scale {-S, ... ,0, ... , S}. Clearly S = 0 denotes the neutral score. 
Well-known scales of this sort arise when S = 5 or S= 1. Their interpretation is: 
S=5 -5 extremely bad S=1 -1 bad 
-4 very bad 0 neutral 
-3 bad +1 good 
-2 rather bad 
-1 unsatisfactory 
0 neutral 
1 satisfactory 
2 rather good 
3 good 
4 very good 
5 extremely good 
Two methods will be discussed now that can be used to obtain group preferences for 
the alternatives for a group of experts starting from scores of the individual experts for 
the different alternatives. In the first method direct determination of the scores on the 
given scale is used. In the second method pairwise comparison of alternatives on this 
scale is used. Note that our scales differ from those in the pairwise comparisons as 
proposed by Saaty (1980) who uses a 9-point scale from 1 to 9. In the assessment of 
the scores two aspects of fuzziness have to be taken into account: 
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(i) On an individual level: uncertainty in a person's assessment due to various 
interpretations, points of view, absence of criteria etc. 
(ii) On a team level: differences in opinion between various team members about 
the preferences. 
The fuzziness in the individual ratings will be modeled by interval scores. Hence, 
obtaining a group rating for an alternative or for the pairwise comparison of 
alternatives is then a matter of aggregation. Hence, the group preference ordering is 
obtained in two steps. The first step is the assessment of individual scores for the 
alternatives and their aggregation to a group score. The second step consists of 
defining a mapping that translates the scores for the various alternatives in a 
preference ordering. In our approach a group preference will be derived which takes 
the individual scores of the team members explicitly into account. This results in a 
fuzzy preference ordering. Note that this approach differs from the methods listed in 
the book by Shu-Jen Chen and Ching-Lai Hwang (1992) where fuzzy scores are 
transformed into a crisp ordering. We consider fuzziness as a fact of life and try to 
take it into account during the entire FGDMCPS analysis. 
Before our two methods are described in more detail in the following two subsections, 
we define the concept of fuzzy preference ordering here. For convenience we start 
with the definition of a crisp preference ordering. Suppose a set of alternatives A = 
{A], ... , AN} is given. Preference analysis refers to the ordering of these alternatives in 
the following way: 
identify K equivalence classes ~, ... , EK with l;5;.KSN, where an equivalence class 
6c contains at least one alternative, different equivalence classes are mutually 
disjoint and each alternative falls in precisely one class; 
the equivalence classes are linearly ordered as ~ < ... < EK , i.e. a class 6c is 
preferred to a class ~ if and only if k > l. 
Note that any (crisp) preferenc~ ordering can be uniquely identified with a mapping 
p: {I, ... , N} ---+ {I, ... , K} defined by A;e £p(i) for i = 1, ... , N. 
In case of fuzzy ratings a (fuzzy) preference ordering can be found by applying the 
extension principle (see Tanaka, 1997) to the mappingp. This fuzzy preference 
ordering yields a set Po of orderings having nonzero membership grade being a subset 
of the set of all preference orderings. Note that in the crisp case this subset contains 
only one element (with membership grade 1). 
2.1 Method 1 
In this first method we suppose that the experts have given direct interval scores on 
the {-S, ... , S} scale. Suppose that the team consists of R experts and that the score of 
the r-th team member is given by 
r {I ~ (s) = 0 for Q;$; S $; bi 
elsewhere 
(2.1) 
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Note that the membership grade of this fuzzy number 0/ representing the score of one 
of the experts is in fact a characteristic function. Differences in opinion between team 
members introduce extra fuzziness into what membership grade ~(s) applies to a 
rating s for alternative i for the group as a whole. Let us introduce: 
n,( s) =number of persons giving score s to alternative i. 
11i = max niCs) 
s 
Obviously, niCs) = Io; (s). 
r 
Then a logical definition of the fuzzy set ~ representing the group score for 
alternative i, is: 
S E ~ with fuzzy membership value pis), p;{ s) = n;( s) lni . 
In case the scores would be crisp a preference ordering can easily be defined as a 
mapping from the scores S1 , ••• , SN to the set of preference orderings as follows: 
with 
Fls}, ... , SN) = (~, ... , EK) 
p(i) = p(j) <H> Sj = Sj 
p(i) > p(j) <H> Sj > s) 
The fuzzy ordering follows from applying the extension principle (see Tanaka, 1997, 
page 37) to this function: 
with 
F1(01' ... ,ON) = Ip(p)1 p 
peP 
p(p)= max min Pi(Si) 
s=(Sj .. ··,sN) i 
F!(s)=p 
(2.2) 
(2.3) 
Formula (2.3) is rather abstract. Below we work it out and give two concrete methods 
to find the membership grade of any ordering. 
a. ~-cut method 
We may use a discrete version of the llmax-cut method (see Tanaka, 1997). (For 
visibility, we use L-R fuzzy numbers in a continuous universe in the figures in the 
sequel.) Let a fuzzy membership function p be given. Consider the a-level set (a>O). 
Then we have 
p-} (a)=s J or S2 , as shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1 
This concept can be used in the following way. Construct all possible preference 
orderings. Note that for N alternatives there exist far more than N! possible orderings 
in case the equivalence classes contain more than one element. However, if the 
support of the fuzzy rating for a certain alternative has no intersection with the 
support of the fuzzy rating for another alternative, then the first alternative will always 
be preferred to the second or the other way round. This argument decreases the 
number of possible orderings with nonzero membership grade considerably. For any 
preference ordering p, the membership grade p(p) follows from seeking the concrete 
lXmax assuming that the alternatives constitute this preference ordering, so 
J1(p )=max {al a s.t. the N-tuple (p;l (a),,·· ,p;l (a» <E- p } 
(p;1 (a), ... ,p;1 (a» <E- p means (PI-l (a) .. ·· .p;1 (a» in accordance with p. 
We illustrate the lXmax-cut method by means of the following example. 
Example 
Suppose there are 4 alternatives AJ, ••• , A 4• Their fuzzy preferences membership 
functions are shown in Figure 2 below. 
11 
1 
a2 
Qj J-----f----Y 
Figure 2 
J..l4( s) 
In this example there are 9 possible preference orderings Pl , ••• , P9. The fuzzy 
membership values of each ordering is computed with the lXmax-cut concept. The 
results are: 
PJ={Ar<Az-<Aj-<A4}, J1(PJ)=l ~lXmax=l; 
P2={Al=A2"<A3~}, J1(P2)= a3~lXmax=aj; 
P3={Az-<Ar<Aj-<A4}, P(P3)= a3~lXmax=a3; 
P4={Al-<A2""<A3=~}, p(P4)= ar-~lXmax=az; 
Ps={Ar<Az-<A4-<Aj}, p(Ps)= a2; 
P6={A1=Az-<A3=A4}, J1(P6)= aj; 
P7={AJ=Az~-<Aj}, J1(P7)= a3; 
P8={A2-<Ar< Aj=~}, J1(P8)= aj; 
P9={A2-<A1 -<A4-<Aj }, J1(P9)= aj. 
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(2.4) 
Here, Ac-<iA.j denotes that alternative Aj is preferred to alternative Ai. 
b. Pairwise formula 
Assume that the alternatives constitute a preference ordering p. Then a 
relation 9t between scores Si and Sj for the alternatives A and Aj respectively, is defined 
as follows: 
ifAi>-Aj 
if Ai = Aj 
if Ai -<Aj 
With this definition formula (2.3) can be rewritten as 
.Qr, equivalently, 
Here the symbol "1\" denotes the min-operation_ 
(2.5) 
(2.6) 
(2.7) 
Working out the formula (2.6) or (2.7) yields the same result as the amax-cut method. 
2. 2. Method 2 
In the second method the ratings on the discrete scale {-S, ... , 0, ... , S} are related to 
the pairwise comparison of alternatives. Now in an analogous way as in method 1 this 
leads us to membership grades ~I(s) indicating the degree in which score S applies to 
the comparison of alternative i with alternative j, according to team member r. As for 
consistency under interchanging i andj, it is obvious that we require the scale to be 
symmetric around 0 for every team member's judgement, i.e., ~I(s) = 8/(-s). Finding 
a preference ordering is more complicated than with method 1. Due to possible 
inconsistencies in the pairwise comparisons the preference ordering of the alternatives 
does not always follow uniquely from the pairwise scores Sij (see Saaty, 1980). A 
simple way to circumvent this problem could be to reduce the information found in 
method 2 to information as necessary in method 1. This condensation can easily be 
done by defining Sj = L sij , but this approach, though simple and pragmatic, is hardly 
in the spirit of the pairwise comparison method. Here we consider a direct method to 
find the fuzzy preference ordering of the alternatives taking into account the 
individual fuzzy scores as well as the inconsistencies in these scores. The method 
starts with the determination of the individual ratings for the pairwise evaluations of 
the alternatives on the {-S, ... ,0, ... , S} scale. Suppose, as before, that the team 
consists of R members and that the rating of the r-th expert is given by the interval 
score: 
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r {I ~j (s) = 0 
Let us introduce 
for aij '5. s S bij 
elsewhere 
nij( s) =number of persons giving score s to the pairwise comparison of 
alternative i to alternative j. 
nij = max nij(s) 
s 
Clearly, nij (s) = LO;(s) . 
A straightforward definition for the fuzzy set Oij representing the group score for 
comparison of alternatives i and j is: 
S E 8;j with fuzzy membership degree J.1ii s), J.1ij( s) = nils) Inij' 
(2.8) 
Before we can define the fuzzy preference ordering for these fuzzy scores we first 
have to define the deterministic mapping F2 from the scores of the pairwise 
comparisons to the set of preference orderings. This mapping takes into account 
explicitly the inconsistencies in the pairwise comparisons by using a lexicographical 
gauging principle. 
By choosing a gauge Aio '3, unique preference ordering follows from the scores Sio,j 
through 
p(i) > p(j) H Sio,i <Sio;j 
p(i) = p(j) H Sio,i =Sio,j 
Analogously, using two gauges: Aio and next Ail a more discriminative preference 
ordering follows from 
p(i) > p(j) H [ Sio,i < Sio.j or if Sio.i = Sio,j then SiU < Sil,j] 
p(i) = p(j) H [ Sjo,i = Sio,j A SiU = SO,} ] 
This lexicographical recipe can easily be generalized to three or more gauges. 
The fuzzy ordering follows from the application of the extension mapping (see 
Tanaka, 1997) 
F2 ({Oij I i,j = l, ... ,n,i"* j}) = LJ.1(p)! P 
pep 
with 
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(2.9) 
(2.10) 
The interpretation of the symbol 9\ in Eq.(2.1 0) is similar to the interpretation in the 
previous subsection. Assume that the alternatives constitute a preference structure p. 
Given a preference structure, then for arbitrary scores sij the binary relation is defined 
as follows: 
{
S .. >0 I,j 
SiJ·9\O= s·· 0 
, I,J 
S. <0 I,j 
if Ai >-Aj 
if Ai =Aj 
if Ai -<Aj 
{
Sj'iV > S j.io 
S·· 9\ S·· = S .. = S·· 
1'/0 l,IO "'0 ),10 
suo < S j,io 
if Ai >-Aj 
if Ai =Aj 
ifAj -<Aj 
Note that in this extension a single gauge is used. 
We illustrate this method with an example. 
Example 
(2.11) 
(2.12) 
Suppose there are 4 alternatives AI. ... , A4• The membership grades for the group 
scores for the pairwise comparisons between alternatives 1-2, 1-3, 1-4, 2-3, 2-4 and 4-
3 are given in Figure 3 below. 
For the ordering PJ={Ar-,43--Az--,4J}, we can use formula (2.10) to calculate its 
membership grade p(PJ) as follows, using Figure 3. 
--------~------~--~~-L--~~--~~~--~--_.S 
o 
Figure 3 
sup Lll12 (SI,2 9\0)] = sup [,u 12 (s1.2 > 0)] = 1 
SI,2 Si,2 
. inf sup ['ul,i/ Suo ).I\ 'u2,io (S2,i)] = . inf (1, 1)=1 10'/0;01,2 SI,IjJ9tSZ.io 10,10;01,2 
Then sup ['u12(SI,29\0)].I\ i ip! 2 sup ['ul,i
o 
(SI,io ) .1\ 'uZ,io (S2,io )]=1 
SI,2 0' 0 , SUo9tS2.iQ 
9 
sup LUI3(Sl,39i0)]=sup [,uI3(Sl,3 > 0)] =1 
51,3 51,3 
inf SUp [,uI,i
O 
(St,i
O
) A ,u3.i
o 
(S3,i
O
)] = inf (1, 1)=1, as shown in Figure 4. 
'0,10.,1,3 5 . 9\S . '0,10.,1,3 
1,10 3,'0 
Then sup [,uB (S1,39iO)] A, in! 3 sup [,ul,i
n 
(SUo) A ,u3,io (S3,io)] =1 
51.3 '0,10 • SI,i09\S3,iO 
Figure 4 
sup [P14(Sl,49i0)]=sup [,ul4(SI,4 > 0)] =1 
S1,4 SI,4 
, in~ 4 sup [p \,io (SUo) A ,u 4,10 (S4,io )] = . in~ 4 (1, 1)= I, as shown in Figure 5. 
'0,'0", Sl,io9\S4J{) '0,'0" , 
Then sup [P14 (SI,49i0)] A" ~in!,4 sup [,uUJSI.Io) " P4,io (S4,Io)] =1 
SI,4 0 0 SUo 9\S4,10 
P 
Figure 5. 
sup [,u23 (S2.39i0)] = sup [P23(S2,3 > 0)] =0.67 . 
52 ,3 S2,3 
i ~n!23 sup [P2.iO (S2.io) ",u3,io(S3,io)]= ,in!z~(1, 1)=1,asshowninFigure6. 
o· 0 • 52,i09\S2.io '0.
'
0 ,< 
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--------~----~~--~~~--~~----~~-------.s 
o 
Figure 6. 
sup [,u24 (S2,49tO)] = sup [,u24 (SZ,4 > 0)] =1 
Si,4 S2,4 
. inf sup [,u2,i
o 
(S2.i
o
) 1\ ,u4,i
o 
(S4,i
o
)l= . inf (1, 1)=1, as shown in Figure 7. 
'0"0 .. 2,4 S2,i0 9tS4.iQ '°"0 .. 2,4 
Then sup [,u24 (S2.49tO)] 1\. in£ 4 sup [,u2.iO (S2,i) 1\ ,u4,iO (S4.io )]=1 
S2,4 '0,'0 ' S2,i09tS4.iQ 
,uu(S) 
s 
o 
Figure 7. 
sup [,u34 (S3,49t0)] = sup [,u34(S3,4 > 0)]=1 
S3,4 S3.4 
,in$;4 sup [,u3,io (S3.io ) 1\ ,u4,io (S4,io )] = . in~4 (1, 1)=1, as shown in Figure 8, 
'0·'0 • S3.iQ9tS3,io '0,'0" , 
Then sup [,u34(S3,49t0)]I\. i,n$;4 sup [,u3,iO (S3.iO ) 1\,u4,iO(S4.iO }] =1 
S3,4 '0,10 ' S 3.iQ 9tS3_0 
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o 
Figure 8. 
Obviously, from formula (2.10) it follows that f.1{P})=0.67. 
Analogously, we obtain the following membership grades for the possible orderings. 
f.1{Pj ) 
s,= {A.-<1I, -<1I j -<1l3} j.l(Pj ) P 1 = { A4 -<li4.3 -<Ii4. 2 -<Ii4.] } 0.67 0 
P 2 = {A 3 -<li4.4 -<Ii4. 2 -<Ii4. d 0 P J4 = {A 2 -<li4.4 -<Ii4.]-<1i4. 3} 0 
P3={A4-<1i4.2-<1i4.3-<1i4.1} 0.4 P 15={Aj ~-<Ii4.2-<1i4.3} I 0 
P 4 = {A 2 -<li4.4 -<Ii4. 3 -<Ii4. d 0 P 16= { A4 -<Ii4.] -<Ii4. 2 -<Ii4. 3 } 0 
P5={Az-<li4.3~-<Ii4.d 0 P 17= {A 2 -<li4.1 -<li4.4 -<li4.3 j 0 
P6={A3-<1i4.2~-<Ii4.]} 0 P J 8 = {A 1 -<Ii4. Z -<li4.4 -<Ii4. 3} 0 
P7={A4-<1i4.3-<1i4.]-<Ii4.Z} 0.2 P 19 = {A 2 -<Ii4. 3 -<Ii4. J -<li4.4} 0 
P 8= {A 3 -<li4.4 -<li4.1 -<Ii4. Z} 0 P ZO= {A 3 -<Ii4. 2 -<Ii4. J -<li4.4} 0 
p 9= { A4 -<li4.1-<1i4. 3 -<Ii4. Z} 0 P 21 = {A 1 -<Ii4. 3 -<Ii4. 2 -<li4.4 } 0 
p ]0= {A 1 -<li4.4 -<Ii4. 3 -<Ii4. 2} 0 P 22 = {A3 -<li4.1-<1i4. 2 ~} 0 
. P 11 = {A 3 -<Ii4.] -<li4.4 -<Ii4. z} 0 P 23= {A2-<11/-<1I3 -<114} --t--%--
P 12 = {A J -<li4.3 -<li4.4 -<Ii4. z} 0 I P 24 = {A 1 -<Ii4. 2 -<Ii4. 3 -<li4.4} 0 
As can be seen in the table, only Pj, P3 and P7 have nonzero membership grades. This 
is caused by the use of the first min-operation in formula (2.10). A result of this use is 
that for any two alternatives Aio and Ajo the following holds: no matter how consistent 
the other pairwise comparisons are made, if J1( S;o,jo>0 )=0 any ordering including 
A;o>-Ajo has membership grade zero. 
As often in fuzzy set theory, the choice of operator is not completely obvious. In this 
case it might be better to replace the first min-operation in formula (2.10) by a max-
operation. In that case Eq.(4.1O) will be replaced by 
12 
From the result between brae kets ({ }) it is obvious now that for any two 
Ao and Ajo any fuzzy orderin ~ including Aio>-Ajo has nonzero members hi 
least if the pairwise compari~ 
alternatives 
p degree at 
atives are ons of the two alternatives with other altern 
consistent. 
Using formula (2.13) instead of (2.10) yields the following results: 
p ~Pi) p(P;) 
Pj={ArAr<Ar<AJ} 1 P 13={ Ar<Ar<Ar<AJ} 0.48 
P2={ArA rAr <AJi 0 P14={Ar<ArAr<AJl 0 
P3={A4-<A2-<Ar<Ad 1 P15={A/~-<A2-<A31 0 
P4={A2-<A4-<AJ-<Ad 0 P 16={ A4-<Aj-<A2-<A3} 0.48 
P5={A2-<AJ~-<AJ} 0 P I7={A2-<A}-<A4-<A3} 0 
P6={AJ-<A2-<A4-<Ad 0 Pjs={Aj-<A2-<A4-<AJl 0 
P7={A4-<AJ-<Aj -<A2} 0.5 P j9={A2-<AJ-<A/-<A41 0 
Ps={A3-<A4-<A/-<A21 0 P2o={AJ-<A2-<A/~1 0 
P9={ A4-<Aj-<AJ-<A21 0.48 P2j={Al-<AJ-<A2~1 0 
PlO={A/-<A4-<Ar<A2} 0 P22={A3-<AJ-<A2~1 0 
PI I={ AJ-<A/-<A4-<A2} 0 P23={A2-<Aj -<A3-<A4} 0 
P 12={Aj-<AJ-<A4-<A2} 0 PZ4={Aj-<A2-<AJ~} 0 
3. FUZZY META GAME ANALYSIS 
From the preparations in the previous section the fuzzy preference orderings of the 
alternatives for both players are known. The question now is what strategies both 
players should choose. To find these strategies we have to combine fuzzy set theory 
with metagame theory into a fuzzy metagame analysis technique. Metagames (see e.g. 
Howard, 1971, Thomas, 1984) are a sort of generalization of games, i.e. games where 
the players' strategies are reaction functions to the opponents' strategies. An 
interesting aspect of metagames is that numerical payoffs are not important, only the 
rank ordering of the payoffs. Apart from the fuzziness in the ranking this is exactly 
what we obtained in the previous section. The fuzziness in the rank orderings of the 
alternatives (which are just combinations of strategies of the two players) makes it 
necessary to extend classical metagame theory to fuzzy metagame analysis. 
In Subsection 3.1 we briefly discuss classical metagames and metaequilibria. 
Following this classical theory, we can find the set of stable symmetric metaequilibria 
for any preference ordering. The problem now is how to rate these metaequilibria 
taking into account the membership grades of the various preference orderings. Based 
on this rating, the group of experts has to decide which set of strategies is the most 
rational for both players. For this decision Jain's extension for an approach developed 
by Baas and Kwakernaak (1977) to rate and rank multiple-aspect alternatives using 
fuzzy sets is used. This problem is considered in Subsection 3.2. In Subsection 3.3 
some attention is paid to postoptimal analysis of the solution found in Subsection 3.2. 
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3.1 Metaequilihria 
Let the strategies of players 1 and 2 be given by the sets X={xj, X2, "', xm} and 
Y={Yl, Y2, "', Yn}, respectively. Then the set of alternatives considered in Section 2 
can be given by the matrix 
where Uij corresponds to player 1 playing strategy Xi and player 2 strategy Yj. Now 
suppose that a double matrix of non-fuzzy preferences for both players for U is 
given by 
(p,q)1I (P,q)12 
(P,Q) = (P,q)21 (P,q)22 
(p,q)ml (p,q)m2 
(p,q)ln 
(p,q)2n 
(p,q)mn 
Here p denotes the fIrst player's preference and q his opponent's preference. Next, 
the metaequilibrium solution set E is defIned as follows: 
where 
and 
e1 = mint max(p) ii' max(p) i2"", max(p) in} 
I I I 
e2 = max{min(q)il' min(q)j2"", m~n(q)in} 
I , t 
e3 = max{min(p)\i,min(p)2j'''' ,min(p)mj} 
J ] J 
e4 = min{max(q)\j , max (qh j ,'" ,m~(q)mj} . ] J ] 
(3.1) 
(3.2) 
(3.3) 
(3.4) 
(3.5) 
(3.6) 
Each metaequilibrium (Le. combination of strategies for the players) in E corresponds 
with a future situation that is acceptable by both players under the given defInite 
preferences. These equilibria situations are considered as possible stable future 
situations from which the strategies and actions of the players can be found. Let us for 
completeness give a brief explanation. Obviously each player has two options for his 
game politics: playing "reactive optimization" and "proactive optimization". It is 
reasonable that for each player only future states are acceptable which have at least a 
preference as high as those obtainable by either a reactive or a proactive policy. Now 
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ej, e3 are the worst case preferences for player 1 under a reactive, proactive policy, 
respectively. The interpretation of e4, ez is the same, but now for player 2. 
For convenience, we introduce the metaequilibrium acceptability indicator here: 
/ {
I if uij E E 
A(Uij (p,q»== 0 if u· e E lJ 
(3.7) 
3.2 Policy selection based on fuzzy metaequilibria analysis 
The metagame analysis described in the previous subsection can be considered as a 
mapping from definite crisp pairs of preference orderings for both players to the space 
of metaequilibria, i.e., T: (P, Q)~ E. E is also a crisp metaequilibria set. The result of 
the preference analysis in Section 2 is a fuzzy set of preference orderings for both 
players. In that case the metagame analysis can be worked out for any pair of 
orderings (p,q). The question then arises how the fuzziness in the orderings can be 
taken into account in the final decision which strategies both players should choose. A 
'straightforward method using induced mappings and the extension principle (see 
Tanaka, 1997, page 35) is the following. 
Let the set of pairs of preference orderings having nonzero membership grades for 
both parties be given by Po><Qo == {Ol, OZ, "', or}. Then the highest ranking pair of 
preference orderings (also referred to as the mosl gtable metaequilibrium) follows 
from taking the maximum over all symmetric stable metaequilibria uij of the 
maximum membership degrees of the preference orderings inducing this 
metaequilibrium, i.e. the maximum over all metaequilibria of max Oer1(u.)p(O). Here, 
Q 
the membership degree /1(0) = I1(P,q) = min{/1(p), /1(q)}. Unfortunately, this method is 
not very discriminative, so a number of alternatives might give the same maximal 
membership degree. Therefore, we search for another more discriminative method to 
obtain the most stable metaequilibrium. In general, the aggregation over all pairs of 
preference orderings with nonzero membership grades for a stable symmetric 
metaequilibrium Uij is given by 
(3.8) 
In the literature several proposals are given for the aggregation operator. A rating 
method that yields the most stable metaequilibrium is Jain's extension (Zimmermann, 
1980, page 154) of a method developed by Baas and Kwakernaak (1977) to rate and 
rank multiple-aspect alternatives using fuzzy sets. In their approach the scores of the 
alternatives as well as the weights of the criteria are modeled by fuzzy sets. Translated 
to our problem setting the method works as follows. The elements of the set Po><Qo of 
pairs of preference orderings with nonzero fuzzy membership grades J1(p, q) act as test 
criteria (p,q) for the symmetric stable metaequilibrium Uij with fuzzy weights p(p,q). 
So, in this case the aggregation operator in (3.8) is simply the sum-operator. Note that 
Aij is a fuzzy number defined on a discrete subset of the interval [0,2:], where 1: is the 
number of elements in the set P oxQo. 
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The best possibility is found by assigning a definite "best choice" degree to each U ioio 
using a standard procedure to extend the map 
if J: .. = max {J: . . !'} 
':.>'010 ':.>'010' ':.> 
else 
(3.9) 
to fuzzy numbers. Here we use Jain's approach by introducing an idealized dummy 
best case ~ with 
(3.10) 
where [lmin, lmax] is the smallest interval containing the support of all Aij. Let hioJo be 
the membership grade of 1 in H . . {Aij, ~} and hm= max hi~J' . Then the "best 
'010 io,ia -v 0 
choice" degree Zi " is by definition 
0' 0 
(3.11) 
This degree shows clearly which policy we should take: Z" J' =1 indicates the best 
0, 0 
possibility. Note that there might be ties also in this method. 
3.3 Postoptimal analysis 
The analysis in this and the previous section yields a most stable metaequilibrium, and 
more in general, a fuzzy set of metaequilibria and their fuzzy membership grades. The 
most stable metaequilibrium needs not be the most preferred alternative by both 
opponents. The question then arises whether the parties will accept the outcome of the 
analysis taking into account the consequences for the future situation in case the 
strategies in accordance with the most stable metaequilibrium would be followed. In 
case the decision maker does not accept the outcome of the analysis, he might decide 
to undertake action to influence the opponent's preferences for the various 
alternatives. If the set of actions is known, one can simply perform the analysis once 
more for each action. Then, that action can be chosen that influences the preferences 
of the opponent in such a way that the rest;llting most stable metaequilibrium comes 
closest to the preferred alternative. If preferred, the decision maker can also weigh out 
the costs of an action and the acceptability of the resulting most stable 
metaequilibrium. In case the actions are not known beforehand, one might search for a 
direction to undertake action that costs least. A reasonable assumption is that the size 
and number of changes in the preference ordering of the opponent caused by an action 
is directly related to the costs of that action. Then the decision maker might weigh out 
costs and degree of improvement of the most stable metaequilibrium in the direction 
of the most preferred situation. Obviously, by allowing all changes in opponent's 
preference orderings, there is a combination (p,q) of preference orderings for which 
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the most preferred alternative is equal to the most stable metaequilibrium. 
Unfortunately, it might take a lot of effort to reach this situation. 
4. EXAMPLE 
In this section we give an example to illustrate the FGDMCSP as described in the 
previous sections. 
Suppose that two producers of kitchenware are planning to market a new kitchen tool 
with a number of applications in the area of food processing. 
Player 1 may choose from the following strategies Xj, XZ, X3: 
Xl: to market a high quality product with a large number of applications that needs a 
long time to be pushed into the market; 
Xz: to market a medium quality and less extensive product that needs less time to be 
pushed into the market; 
X3: to market a low quality product with a small number of applications that can be 
pushed into the market quite quickly. 
Player 2 may choose from the following strategies: 
YI: to market a moderate quality and quite extensive product that needs a moderate 
period of time to be pushed into the market; 
Yz: to market a rather low quality product with few applications which needs very 
little time to be pushed into the market. 
For convenience, we consider ourselves as player 1 and we assume that a group of 
experts from our company has to determine the preferences for the various 
combinations of strategies both for ourselves and our opponent. Criteria that playa 
role in this preference elicitation process such as market share of both companies in 
different market segments, quality image and profit are not taken into account 
explicitly . 
. In Subsection 4.1 the analysis is performed using the direct rating technique using 
formula (2.3). In Subsection 4.2 a pairwise comparison analysis to obtain preferences 
is worked out both with formulas (2.10) and (2.13). 
Our strategies are given by the set X={XI, XZ, X3}, while our opponent's strategy set is 
Y, Y={YJ, yz}. Then the set of future situations U is given by 
In the sequel, these 6 alternatives are sometimes denoted as Al up to A6, for 
convenience. 
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4.1 Analysis using direct determination of scores 
Assume that the interval scores of the five experts for the alternatives seen from the 
point of view of our company are given in the following Table 1 (assuming S=5). 
UnCAl) un(A2) u2ICA3) u22(A4) u3ICA5) U32(A6) 
1 -3, -2, -1 -5, -4, -3 5,4 3,2,1 -4, -3 0,1,2 
2 -4,-3,-2 -3, -2 4 3,2 -3 0, 1 
3 -2, -1 -5 5,4,3 2 -5, -4, -3 -2,-1,0 
4 -3 -5, -4 5 2, I -3, -2 
° 5 -5, -4 -4, -3 4,3 4 -4 -1,0,1,2 
Table 1. 
The values for n;( s) and Iii (with symbol *) and the membership grades Pi which 
follow immediately from this table are summarized in Tables 2 and 3. 
nICs) nls) nls) nis) n5(s) 
-5 1 3 1 
-4 2 3* 3 
-3 3* 3 4* 
-2 3 1 1 
-1 2 
0 ~ 
1 
, 
1 2 
, 
2 4* 
3 2 2 
4 4* 1 
5 3 
Table 2. 
/-lICs) /-l2( s) /-lls) /-l4( s) /-l5(S) 
-5 113 1 0 0 1,4 
-4 213 1 0 0 3A 
-3 1 1 0 0 1 
-2 1 113 0 0 1,4 
-1 2/3 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
1 0 0 0 1/2 0 
2 0 0 0 1 0 
3 0 0 1/2 1/2 0 
4 0 0 1 114 0 
5 0 0 3/4 0 0 
Table 3. 
In Table 5 the preference orderings having nonzero membership grades are listed. 
Their membership grades which follow from formula (2.3) are given in Table 4. 
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nds) 
1 
2 
5* 
3 
2 
/-l6( s) 
0 
0 
0 
115 
215 
1 
3/5 
215 
0 
0 
0 
I PI P2 P3 P4 Ps P6 P7 VR V9 
J1{Pi) 3/4 1 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/5 2/5 2/5 
PIO Pll PI2 P13 PI4 PIS PI6 P17 P1S 
J1{Pi) 2/5 2/5 2/5 1/5 115 115 1/5 114 114 
Table 4. 
PI A3>-~>-A6>-A 1>-A2>-A5 A3>-~>- ~>-A2>-A5>-Al 
P2 A3>-~>-A6>-Al >-A5>-A2 A3>-~>- ~>-A5>-Al>-A2 
P3 A3>-~>-A6>-A2>-Al>-A5 P12 A3>-~>- ~>-A5>-A2>-AI 
P4 A3>-~>-~>-A2>-A5>-Al PI] ~~A3>- AI>-~>-A2>-A5 
Ps A3>-~>-A6>-A5>-A 1>-A2 P14 ~>-A3>- AI>-~>- As>-A2 
A3>-~>-~>-A5>-A2>-Al PIS A3>-~>- Al>-~>- A2>-As 
P7 A3>-~>- ~>-Al>-A2>-A PI6 A3>-~>- AI>-~>- As>-A2 
PS 3>-A6>- ~>-Al>-As>- P17 ~>-A3>- A6>-AJ>- A2>-As 
P9 A3>-~>- ~>-A2>-AI>-As PIS ~>-A3>- ~>-Al>- As>-A2 
Table 5. 
In the same way, the group of experts assesses the preferences for the various 
alternatives from our opponent's point of view. The results are summarized in Tables 
6 up to 10. 
ti.ll(AI ) u12(A2) U21(AJ) U22(A4) U31(As) U32(A6) 
1 5,4 5,4,3 4,3,2 -4, -3 -4,-3 -1. 0, 1 
2 4,3,2 4,3 3,2, 1 -4,-3, -3 -1,0 
3 5,4,3 5,4 4,3 -5, -4,-3 -5, -4, -3 -2, -1 
4 4,2 4 5,4,3 -3, -2 -3, -2 -1 
5 5,4 4,3,2 3,2,1 -5 -4 -2,-1,0 
Table 6. 
nds) n2(s) nls) nis) ns(s) n6(s) 
-5 2 1 
-4 3 3 
-3 4* 4* 
-2 1 1 2 
-1 5* 
0 3 
1 2 1 
2 2 1 3 
3 2 3 5* 
4 5* 5* 3 
5 3 2 1 
Table 7. 
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J.lls) J.l2( s) J.l3( s) f./4( s) J.l5(S) f.J<,( s) 
-5 112 1,4 
-4 3/4 3,4 
-3 1 1 
-2 1/4 1,4 215 
-1 1 
0 3/5 
1 215 115 
2 215 115 3/5 
3 215 3/5 1 
4 1 1 3/5 
5 3/5 215 115 
Table 8. 
ql Al>-A2>-A3>- ~>- A.>- As q7 AJ>-A3>- A2>- ~>- A.>-As 
q2 AJ>-A2>-A3>- ~>- As>- A. 
*-f AI>- A3>- A2>- ~>- As>- A. q3 A2>-AJ>-A3>- ~>- A.>- As A2>- A3>- AJ>-A6>- A.>- As 
q4 A2>-A,>-A3>- ~>- As>- A. qlO A2>- A3>- A 1>- A6>- As>- A. 
qs A3>- AI>-A2>-~>-As>- A. qll A3>- A2>-A1>- ~>-A5>- A. 
q6 A3>- Al>-A2>-~ >- A.>- As q12 A3>- A2>-Al>-~ >- A.>- As 
Table 10. 
At this point the set P oXQo of preference orderings with nonzero membership grades 
and the membership grade of each member of this set can be determined. This set 
contains 18x12=216 elements. Fuzzy metagame analysis can be performed now using 
a simple computer program. It appears that the set of symmetric stable metaequilibria 
E ={U2}, U32}. Then the straightforward maximum method and Jain's method as 
defined in Section 3 yield: 
0.4 o 
Table 11. 
It follows from Table 11 that the alternative U21 is the most stable metaequilibrium, 
corresponding to the strategies Xl and y 1, seen through the eyes of the group of experts 
working for our company. 
20 
4.2 Analysis using pairwise comparisons 
The judgements of the five experts for the pairwise comparison of alternatives on a 
scale with S=5 are listed in Table 12. Because of the symmetry in the pairwise 
comparisons, only the comparisons A/Aj withj larger than i are listed. (Note that 
A/A=O.) 
AlIAJ AlIA3 IA4 AlIAs AlIA6 A:z/A3 AJ1A4 
1 -2,-1 -5,-4 -4 1 3,2,1 -5 -5,-4 
2 -1 -4,-3,-2 -4,-3 
° 
2,1 -5 -3,-2 
3 I -2,-1 -3 -5,-4,-3 -2,-1 1,0,-1 -5,-4 -5,-4 
4 0,1 -5 -2,-1 -1,0,1 3 = 
A 
-4 
5 -1,0 -4,-5 -1,0,1 0,1,2 4,3 -5 -4,-3 
A:z/A6 AJlA4 AJlAs AJlA6 A.,IAs A.,IA6 AslA6 
1 -2,-1 -1 3,2 2 5,4 3,2,1 -1,0 
2 -1 0,1 2 3 4 4,3 -1 
3 -1,0,1 1 2 3,2,1 3,2 3 -2 
4 -2 
° 
4 2,1 4,3 2,1 -2,-1 
5 -2,-1,0 
° 
1,2,3 4,3 3 3,2 -3,-2 
Table 12. 
Now. l1ij(S) and Tlij (with symbol *) and the membership grades ,uij follow immediately 
from 'ilese data (see Tables 13 and 14). All preference orderings having nonze;-(; 
membership grades in case formula (2.10) is used, are listed in Table 16 and their 
membership grades in Table 15. 
n12 1113 n/4 n/5 n/6 n23 n24 n25 n26 n34 n.~5 n36 n45 n46 
-5 3* 1 4* 2 
-4 3* 3* 2 4* 
-3 2 2 2 1 
-2 2 1 1 1 1 2 3 
-1 4* 2 2 1 3* - 4* I 1 
0 2 1 3* 1 2 2 3* 
II 1 1 3 3* 1 2 2 2 2 
2 1 2 4* 3* 1 3 
3 3 2 3 3* 4* 
4 1 1 3 1 
5 1 
Table 13. 
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A:z/As 
° 
-3,-2 
-2,-1 
-1.0 
-1 
n56 
1 
3* 
3 
1 
~12 ~/3 ~14 ~15 ~16 ~23 ~24 ~Z5 ~Z6 ~34 ~35 ~36 ~5 ~46 
-5 1 1/3 1 112 
-4 1 1 1/2 1 
-3 213 2/3 112 113 
-2 112 1/3 113 113 1/4 213 3A 
-1 1 213 2/3 1/3 1 1 1/3 
0 1/2 113 1 113 112 liz 1 
1 1/4 1/3 1 1 IA 213 112 213 1/2 
2 1/3 ,u", 1 1 1/3 3/4 
3 1 1/2 1 1 1 
4 1/3 113 1 114 
5 113 
Table 14. 
PI P2 P3 P4 Ps P6 P7 P8 
J.!{pi) 0.333 0.333 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Table 15. 
PI ~'rA3'rA6'r As'r A2'r Al TJ"i I ~'rA3'r~'r AJ'rAs'r A2 
P2 A3'r~'r A6'r As'r A2'r Al P6 A3'r~'r ~'r AJ'rAs'r A2 
P3 ~'rA3'rA6'r As'r AI'r A2 P7 ~'rA3'r AI'r~'r As'r A2 
P4 A3'r~'r ~'r As'r J""\. P8 A3'r~'r AI'r A6'r As'r A2 
Table 16. 
If we use formula (2.13) rather than formula (2.10), the membership grades for the 8 
preference orderings given in Table 16 change to the values given in Table 17. 
Totally, using (2.13) yields 27 orderings having nonzero membership grades (which 
are listed in Table 17-1). 
PI P2 P3 P4 'PS P6 P7 
J1(Pi) 0.5 0.667 0.5 0.667 0.5 0.667 0.5 
Pa P9 PIO ' Pll P12 P13 P14 
J1(Pi) 0.667 0.333 0.333 0.25 0.25 0.333 0.333 
PIS PI6 P17 PI 8 PI9 P20 P2I 
J1(Pi) 0.25 0.25 0.333 0.333 0.25 0.25 0.333 
P22 P23 Pu P25 I P26 P27 
J.L(Pi) 0.333 0.25 ro:zs 0.333 0.333 0.25 
Table 17. 
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~56 
1/3 
1 
1 
1/3 
PI ~>-A3>-A6>- A5>- A2>- AI PIS ~>-A3>-A5>- A2>-A1>-~ 
P2 A3>-~>- A6>- A5>- A2>- Al P16 A3>-~>- A5>- A2>-A1>-~ 
P3 ~>-A3>-A6>- A5>- A1>- A2 P17 ~>-A3>- A5>- AI>-~>- A2 
P4 A3>-~>- ~>- A5>- AI>- A2 PI8 A3>-~>- A5>-AI>- A6>- A2 
Ps ~>-A3>-A6>- Al>-A5>- A2 PI9 ~>-A3>- A5>- AI>-A2>-~ 
P6 A3>-~>- ~>- AJ>-A5>- A2 P20 A3>-~ A5>- AI>-A2>-~ 
P7 ~>-A3>- Al>-~>- A5>- A2 P21 ~>-A3>- AI>- A5>-~>- A2 
P8 A3>-~>- AI>- ~>- A5>- Az P22 A3>-~>- A1>- A5>-~>- A2 
P9 ~>-A3>-A5>- ~>- A2>- Al P23 At>-A3>- Al>- A5>-A2>-~ 
Plo A3>-At>- A5>- ~>- A2>- Al Pu A3>-~>- AI>- A5>-A2>-~ 
P11 ~>-A3>- A5>- A2>- ~>- AI P2S A3>-AI>- At>- ~>-A5>- A2 
P12 A3>-~>- As>- A2>- ~>- AI P26 A3>-AI>- ~>-A5>- ~>- A2 
Pl3 ~>-A3>-A5>- ~>- AI>- A2 P27 A3>-AI>- At>- A5>-A2>-~ 
P14 A3>-At>- As>": ~>- AI>- A2 
Table 17-1 
1 -1,0 4,3,2 5,4 2,1 3,2,1 2,1 5,4,3 4,3 
I 2 -1 3,2 5,4,3 4,3 3,2 1,0 5 5,4,3 
'~---0--~---5~,4--+-~5~-+--~3~~--4~,3~~--3~,2--~--5-,4--4-~4~~ 
4 0,1 5,4,3 4 3,2 3 1 4 4,3,2 I--___ -+-~:---+-~.:....:..~+--....:--+--=-=---< .. <.--=---I---=--+------I--~..:.;;..--I 
5 -1,0 4,3 4,3 4,3,2 I· 3,2 1,0 5,4 5,4 
F===9=======F======*======~====~.======*=====~======9======9 
A2I'A 6 AyA4 AyAs AyA6 I A.lAs A.lA 6 AslA 6 
1 4,3,2 5,4 3,2 2,1 -1,0,1 -1,0 -4,-3 
2 3,2 4,3,2 3 3,2 0,1 -4,-3 -5,-4,-3 
3 3,2,1 3,2,1 3,2 3,2,1 -1 -3 -3,-2 
4 5,4,3 4 5,4 2,1 -1,0,1 -2,-1 -2,-1 
5 2,1 5,4 5,4,3 4,3 -2,-1 -3,-2 -2,-1 
Table 18. 
-5 1 
-4 1 2 
-3 3* 3* 
-2 1 2 3 
-1 3 4* 2 2 
o 4* 2 3 1 
1 1 1 1 4* 2 1 3 3 
2 2 3 3 2 1 4* 2 2 4* 
3 4* 2 4* 5* 1 I 1 3 4 2 4* 3 
4 4 4* 2 1 4* 5* 2 4* 2 1 
5 2 3 4 2 1 2 2 
Table 19. 
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As in the previous subsection the same analysis has to be perfonned from the 
opponent's. point of view. The results of this analysis are given in Tables 18 up to 24. 
To obtain the results in Tables 21 and 22, (2.10) is used, for the results in Tables 23 
and 24 (2.13). 
1112 1113 1114 1115 1116 1123 1124 1125 1126 1134 1135 1136 1145 1146 
-5 
-4 
+-+-
1/3 
-3 1= 
-2 1/4 213 
-1 3/4 1 213 
u 1 0115 1/2 3/4 1/3 1 1/4 1 1/2 114 3/4 3/4 
2 1/2 3/4 3/5 112 115 1 1/2 
1156 
113 
2/3 
~ 
~ 
213 
3 1 1/2 1 1 1/4 1/4 3/5 1 112 
~1 
1 3/4 r--I 
4 1 1 1/2 1/5 1 1 1/2 1 112 1/4 
5 112 3/4 1 215 114 112 112 
Table 20. 
I JL(q,}-+1-0-!-~~~-I--..... g~.~:--+--0""'~;:!-5----11--0""';;~L:!.;5----l 
Table 21. 
ql A2>-AI>-A3>- ~>- As>-~ q3 A1>-A2>- A3>- ~>- As>-~ 
q2 A2>-Al>-A3>- ~>- ~>- As q4 AI>- A2>- A3>- ~>- ~>-As 
Table 22. 
ql A2>-AI>-A3>- ~>- As>-~ q8 A2>-Al >-~>- A3>- As >-~ 
q2 A2>-AI>-A3>-~ ~>- As q9 A2>-AI >-~ >- A3>-~ >- As 
q3 AI>-A2>- A3>- ~>- As>-~ ql0 A2 >-AI >-A3>- As>- ~>-~ 
q4 AI>- A2>- A3>- ~>- ~>-As qll AI >-A2>-~ >- A3>- As>-~ 
qs A2>-A3>-AI>- ~>- As>-~ q12 AI >-A2>-~ >- A3>-~ >- As 
q6 A2>-A3>-AI>- As>-~ A q13 AI >-A2>- A3>- As>- A6>- A4 
q7 A2>-A3>-AI>-~ >- ~>- As 
Table 24. 
N ow the set P oxQo can be constructed for both cases. 
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In case the max-operator is used (i.e. formula (2.13» the number of elements in PoxQo 
equals 27x-13=351. Fuzzy metagame analysis shows that the set of symmetric stable 
metaequilibria is E = fU2l, un). This result does not contradict the results in the 
previous subsection, because different (and inconsistent) judgements are used in this 
case. The most stable metaequilibrium in this case is U2J, as follows from Table 25. 
Table 25. 
In case the min-operator is used (i.e. formula (2.10), the only element in the set E is 
U2l. Obviously, further analysis is not necessary. 
5. CONCLUSIONS AND SOME REMARKS ON GENERALIZATIONS 
A number of features of real-world decision making problems like uncertainty in 
individual preferences, the implicit trade-offs to be made in individual preferences, 
the implicit trade-offs to be made when individual scores are aggregated to group 
scores and the existence of competition between opponents have been discussed 
extensively in this paper. Obviously, quite a few generalizations are posssible. In the 
solution of the Fuzzy Group Decision Making in a Competitive Situation Problem 
uncertainty in the scores of alterna::l ves (i.e. combination of strategies for both 
competitors) of individuals is modeled by interval scores, but, of course, more general 
(fuzzy) scores can easily be allowed. These scores are aggregated then to fuzzy group 
scores. Two methods are proposed for determining these fuzzy group scores: (a) 
straightforward determination of the scores for the alternatives on a symmetric scale; 
(b) pairwise comparisons of alternatives on the same scale. An alternative for these 
methods is the so-called Graded Range Method in which pairwise comparisons are 
made of all alternatives to the worst alternative. A rather involved extension of the 
methods mentioned here is the use of explicit criteria that playa role in the evaluation 
of the alterenatives. 
Furthermore, these fuzzy group scores are translated into preference orderings using 
crisp preference orderings and the extension principle. For the pairwise comparisons 
in case (b) inconsistency is taken into account by means of a gauging principle using a 
single gauge. The method can easily be extended to take inconsistency into account in 
a more advanced way by using several gauges. 
Metagames are fit for finding stable future situations here, because they depend on 
ordinal preference orderings rather than on exact payoffs of combinations of 
strategies. Therefore, classical metagame analysis is extended to include fuzziness in 
the preference orderings. If desired, more advanced procedures can be considered for 
the metaequilibria rating and finding the highest ranking one. Finally, if the decision 
maker is not satisfied with the outcome of the metagame analysis, he might undertake 
action to influence the opponent's preferences. Of course, a direct relation between 
actions and their effects, also from the opponent's point of view, would be an 
interesting topic for further research on metaequilibrium robustness. 
In a more general setting, an important research topic is the choice of a 'best' 
aggregation operator both for the determination of the group scores and the preference 
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elicitation. Finally, a possible research topic in metagame analysis that is not directly 
related to the FGDMCSP is the use of fuzzy strategies in metagames. 
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